Among the many terms of art you may hear on a golf course is the word “mulligan”, i.e., a request for a “do-over” or second chance to hit the ball from the tee.
In many respects, life gives us second chances, whether with respect to something as silly as requesting a mulligan because you didn’t like your tee shot, changing careers, starting a new chapter post-divorce, and more. When you enter into a divorce agreement, however, you should expect that generally speaking, finality will trump any request for a second chance.
That brings us to Justice James L. Hyer’s recent decision in M.G. v. D.G., 2025 NY Slip Op 52020(U) (Westchester Cty., 2025). In M.G., the plaintiff-husband filed a motion to, inter alia, (a) stay the enforcement of the marital home buyout provisions in the parties’ judgment of divorce, which required the husband to pay the wife $156,762.91, and (b) grant to the husband an equitable credit and/or offset or otherwise adjust the enforcement of the buyout provision in light of a newly obtained refinance appraisal that valued the marital residence at $490,000 versus $625,000.
Without me writing another word, you have likely already figured out what happened in M.G.—the marital home was appraised during the divorce action as having a certain value, which formed the basis of a buyout computation in a settlement agreement.
Then, after the parties’ settlement agreement was signed, one party (the payor in the buyout scenario) got a subsequent appraisal that, if applied in place of the value used in the settlement agreement, would significantly reduce the buyout payment. Which appraisal do you think controls for equitable distribution purposes?
The husband filed for divorce in November 2024. The court appointed a neutral real property appraiser to value the marital residence. The decision recounts that the parties and counsel were advised that they had the right to also retain their own experts.
The parties’ settlement agreement (Stipulation of Settlement) “confirmed the parties’ mutual intent to set forth a full and complete resolution of all issues in this action within the terms set forth therein after being fully satisfied with the financial discovery completed.”
The settlement agreement also included language (a) “confirming that the agreement was complete and that it could only be modified with the same formalities as the parties entered into the Stipulation of Settlement”; and (b) acknowledging that the parties were represented by counsel in the preparation and execution of the settlement agreement, “being satisfied with the legal assistance provided…with the understanding that if either sought to set aside the Stipulation of Settlement or any part thereof, that they would be required to pay the other’s legal fees.”
As to the marital residence, the settlement agreement provided that the court-ordered neutral appraiser valued the home at $625,000, the equity is $313,525.82 (mortgage with a principal balance of $311,474.18), and the buyout payment from the husband to the wife was therefore $156,762.91.
The parties’ agreement then provided terms by which the marital residence would be sold and the proceeds distributed if the husband failed to complete the buyout.
In support of the husband’s motion, he submitted an affidavit that stated that three days after the Judgment of Divorce was entered, he “received a new refinance appraisal from Rocket Mortgage in connection with my pending refinance application. That appraisal valued the marital home at $490,000…Because the buyout amount of $156,762.91 was calculated using the higher valuation, enforcing the buyout amount without review would result in a significant and unjust overpayment.”
In denying the husband’s request for a stay because “there is no basis to do so,” the court explained why a second bite at the apple is not authorized under the law and facts of the case:
Here, the parties entered into the Stipulation of Settlement which is a binding contract and includes terms which were clear and unambiguous on their face setting forth Plaintiff’s obligations pertaining to the Marital Domicile, with respect to his option to either buy-out Defendant's share or to move forward with the sale of the property in the event he elects not to engage in the buy-out or cannot do so. Those terms, largely recited above, further confirm that the parties engaged in discovery, waived further discovery, agreed that the Stipulation of Settlement would be a final resolution of the issues arising out of the requested dissolution of their marriage and that those terms would be incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce. The record further confirms that the parties, both represented by counsel (having confirmed their respective satisfaction with the legal services provided to them by their own counsel in the drafting and execution of the Stipulation of Settlement), were also subject to an allocution by this Court prior to the Stipulation of Settlement being so-ordered.
While the decision explains that the court has “inherent power over its own judgments to exercise discretion to set aside or modify judgments…permitting the modification of the equitable distribution provisions of a judgment of divorce would effectively undermine the finality of [matrimonial] judgments” (citations omitted).
With that in mind, to grant the husband’s motion “would not only undermine the finality of the Judgment of Divorce but disregard the bargained for exchange engaged in by the parties with the assistance of counsel.”
While the legal principles explained in M.G. may seem straightforward, they are nonetheless critically important. As a divorcing spouse, when you, with the assistance of counsel, sign a divorce agreement that dictates what equitable distribution of the marital assets will be, setting forth the discovery that has been exchanged, etc., as a rule of thumb (understanding that each case stands on its own facts and so we can’t preach absolutes): there are “no backsies.”
"Equitable Distribution Agreements Are Final Agreements," by Alan R. Feigenbaum was published in the New York Law Journal on February 19, 2026.
Reprinted with permission from the December 22, 2026, edition of the New York Law Journal © 2026 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.
