At the end of 2021, New York State passed legislation that enables parents in New York to petition for extended child support for adult children over the age of 21 who are developmentally disabled under New York law.
The Honorable Stacy D. Bennett’s recent decision in JMC v. VC III (unpublished, March 2026, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) explains how the laws in New York are applied to the facts, and the burden of proof that is required, when a petition for extended child support is filed.
In JMC, the parties signed a settlement agreement in 2007 and were thereafter divorced. At the time, they had three unemancipated children. On September 21, 2021, the parties’ son (“J”) was deemed emancipated under the settlement agreement and the father stopped making child support payments on his behalf to the mother.
Relevant to this discussion is the mother’s motion dated Feb. 1, 2023 seeking an award of child support until J turns 26 “on the basis that he suffers a developmental disability.” In support of her motion, the mother provided the court with a psychological evaluation of J completed by the Genesis Outreach Autism Center (which identified J as having an educational classification of autism), medical records showing that J suffers from “Developmental delay” and “Autistic Disorder,” as well as other medical records showing assessments of J having “ADHD, Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, Impulse Control Disorder, Autistic disorder” and “long term use of therapeutic drug.”
The mother stated that J is “entirely dependent” on her for “prescription management, supervision, manage team of doctors’ appointments, integrate into society, teach activities of daily living and independent living skills, keep him safe during behavioral episodes.”
The father did not refute that the parties’ son has an autism diagnosis, or that he resides with the mother and has functional limitations. His opposition papers did, however, allege, inter alia, that the mother’s application asserted “bare … legal conclusions … without providing any substantive proof.”
As the decision explains, to demonstrate that a child is “developmentally disabled” under the Mental Hygiene Law (Section 1.03(22)), a professional diagnosis must be submitted by a specific professional (e.g., a physician, licensed psychologist, licensed social worker). Once established that a child is developmentally disabled, the court must determine if the applying party “qualifies to receive such support.”
The parent who makes the motion must “live with the child and the child must be principally dependent on the applying party for support.” The court is only authorized to consider the financial burden on the applying party for the “period of time” between when the child stopped receiving child support until he or she reaches the age of 26.
At a hearing, the mother testified that she is J’s sole caregiver “who requires full-time supervision. She assists him in every aspect of his life; she cooks his meals, cleans the home, does his laundry, maintains his bank accounts, makes and transport[s] him to all medical/dental/educational appointments, and helps him with his independent living skills and medication management.” The mother testified that she is “employed as a home health aide” for J and “is unable to work in any additional capacity.”
Based on the “voluminous records” submitted by the mother “confirming the uncontroverted evidence supporting the parties’ son’s diagnoses,” the Court directed that the father’s child support obligation be paid retroactive to the date of the mother’s motion (February 1, 2023) to the date of J’s 26th birthday, to wit: Oct. 1, 2025.
One practice point to note: the decision states that “the ex-wife annexed numerous documents to her post-hearing submission which were never offered into evidence at the hearing and, as such, same were not considered by this court.” Indeed, post-trial briefs cannot be used to circumvent the rules of evidence.
Notably, at the end of the hearing, the father “advised the court” he was seeking an award of counsel fees. He argued that the mother used the court system as a “fishing expedition to seek information about his life, his current wife and her assets” which resulted in a “protracted hearing.” The Court agreed:
Despite the limited scope of the hearing, it proceeded for six days and much of the time was devoted to the ex-wife making inquiry relative to issues that were well outside the parameters of the issues before the court…there were multiple times when this Court was required to remind the ex-wife of [the] purpose of the hearing and redirect the ex-wife to the relevant time period…
It was clear to this court that throughout the hearing, the ex-wife sought to secure information from the ex-husband for which she was not entitled and her line of questioning led to the expenditure of time by the ex-husband’s counsel which would not have been incurred but for the ex-wife’s inquiries.
As a result, the court awarded attorney fees to the father in the sum of $8,000. If you are litigating a case wherein one party is prolonging a trial thanks to questioning that goes beyond the scope of the hearing, consider relying on the JMC case in support of a counsel fee application.
Returning to the main issue at hand, JMC is instructional in that is identifies, in this author’s opinion, the gravity of the disability that must be established to merit a further award of child support to age 26. Once again, relief may be granted upon a showing of actual evidence in support of your claims and not a generalized kitchen sink of rhetoric and hyperbole.
"Child Support for Developmentally Disabled Adult Children," by Alan Feigenbaum was published in the New York Law Journal on June 25, 2026. Reprinted with permission.