Out of Wonderland from *Diehr* to *Aatrix*: 3 Steps to Overcoming 101 Rejections

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Step 3: Tie Amended Claims and Your Remarks to Relevant 101 Cases

Regardless of the Examiner’s attitude, it can be useful to draft your application or amend your claims to follow a clear case-law based foundation. This means following not only the Alice test in application, but also those cases where claims were determined to pass muster by courts whether applying the Alice test or Diamond v. Diehr. Moreover, it may be critical to shape your arguments based on how the invention has improved over the prior art from a technological standpoint. This is to avoid Alice step 2: the argument that all the patent does is computerize the prior art using standard components merely as “tools” to carry out the abstract idea itself. To the extent you want the claims to be tied to algorithms, structures, or logic, the specification includes means plus function language (“MPF”) which is interpreted more narrowly. The MPF format was found to be helpful in Enfish since it provided a shortcut to ample technical support language in the patent specification. And if the Examiner rejects the claims based on mere conclusions, then by all means use the Berkheimer case, which to date has not made it to the ever-growing PTO guidelines. Finally, you may not be able to the claims to the algorithms and rules if they are not disclosed in the original specification, so, when possible, include specific technical features during patent drafting—details that might have been left out in a pre-Alice world. You may even want to consider adding source code in an Appendix (a key consideration in the Visual Memory case), which could provide flexibility later on in the event you want to avoid a new matter rejection.

CONCLUSION

Post-Alice, the PTO is aggressively rejecting software claims under the Alice two-part test, the parameters of which many Examiners are still trying to understand. By following the steps discussed here, you have the best shot at overcoming a non-statutory subject matter rejection:

1. Interview the Examiner to see if he or she has specific claim terms in mind.
2. Read the specification to find:
   a. Technological details of the claimed invention;
   b. Descriptions of the control of external hardware;
   c. Specific processing rules or logic that improve hardware performance;
   d. Descriptions of improved display interfaces; and
   e. Clear differences from non-computer/non-internet practices.
3. Revise claims with specificity, including using means or step plus function language where technological details are important, and avoiding the recitation of mere processing results.
4. Tie remarks into specific Federal Circuit cases.
5. Dispute conclusory statements asking for evidence by the Examiner by citing Berkerheimer and by or providing evidence through an expert affidavit.
6. If claims are allowed without remarks, add legal justification in subsequent filings to support claims on appeal or in litigation.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2014, the United States Supreme Court in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. removed the presumption that software operating on standard hardware components could avoid being deemed an abstract idea, even though the claim language was sufficiently tied to a machine. Many in the industry saw Alice as a turning point marking the dramatic rollback of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101 for many software-based inventions.

Applying the two-step test developed in the biotechnology decision Mayo, Alice extended the Mayo test to determine patent eligibility for computer software inventions: step one, known as the “filter step,” is whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-eligible concept, such as an abstract idea. If the claims are deemed abstract in step one, then the inquiry passes to step two, which tests whether the elements of the claim contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea determined in filter step one into a patent-eligible invention. To determine step two, the court may look at individual claim limitations or the ordered combination of claim limitations to test whether there is “something more” than the performance of well-understood routine and conventional activities previously performed manually or already known in the industry. While the Alice court noted that software using conventional computer hardware to produce new functions is not subject matter eligible, the Court did not provide specific guidance on when a claim reciting those conventional components is or is not patent eligible.

Not surprisingly, Alice has led to some confusion, among both practitioners and patent examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), about how to apply it from a practical standpoint. For practitioners attempting to patent software, there is plenty of guidance. First, a substantial body of District Court and Federal Circuit cases have construed Alice. Because many of the patents in those cases were written before Alice was decided, many of the earlier cases found against the patentee. Second, there have been a number of cases (especially since the beginning of 2018) that have gone the other way, giving patent owners a glimmer of hope, and, more critically, cogent arguments to counter subject matter eligibility rejections by the PTO.

All the same, it is hard to draw clear conclusions from post-Alice case law other than that the cases are heavily fact dependent and no bright-line test appears evident. Indeed as the Federal Circuit recently wrote: “[T]he problem with articulating a single, universal definition of ‘abstract idea’ is that it is difficult to fashion a workable definition to be applied to as-yet unknown cases with as-yet unknown inventions. Instead of a definition, then, the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen.”

Closely following post-Alice case developments, the PTO issued various examination guidelines and quick reference tools in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. Not surprisingly, the PTO guidelines are lengthy—over 200 pages of instruction, examples, and reference tools in multiple documents including the life sciences. The guidelines, which were released over time, attempt to create order out of cases that are often too confusing, inconsistent, and hard to follow to develop a clear picture. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that some patent examiners are just as confused as practitioners when it comes to dealing with Section 101 and computer software-related inventions.

3. It should be noted that this confusion also extends to non-U.S. practitioners. For example, prior to Alice, the European Patent Office (“EPO”) was seen as having the more restrictive test for software patent eligibility. Despite the express provision excluding the patentability of software under Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”), the EPO has applied a de minimus approach favoring claims evidencing a “technical character,” as long as “any demonstration and degree of ‘technical character’ is shown, such as the ‘mere use’ of a computer.” Since Alice, however, the U.S. subject matter test is stricter—which some practitioners see as a role reversal for the United States.
4. Amgen, 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The purpose of this paper is to draw some conclusions about how to effectively handle software inventions in the post-Alice era before the PTO. Set out below are a few steps that may help alleviate some of the confusion and hopefully provide guidance in overcoming a 101 rejection.

**KNOW THESE 12 CASES**

In developing arguments concerning an outstanding 101 rejection, it is important to begin by knowing those cases that are supportive of patent eligibility. Here is a shorthand guide to the one Supreme Court case and the 11 Federal Circuit decisions that have upheld patent eligibility. The Federal Circuit decisions are organized by which part of the two-step Alice test allowed the claims in those decisions to pass legal muster, then by date.

**CASE 1**

*Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175 (1981): Technically Significant Control of Another Device for Improved Performance

*Diamond v. Diehr* predates *Alice* by 37 years, but represents the only time the U.S. Supreme Court recognized computer software claims as being patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. *Diehr* is still good law and should be used as a basis for supporting your claims, if possible.

The claims at play in *Diehr* involved the computerized application of the 19th-century Arrhenius equation to automated timing and operation of a rubber tire mold. By way of example, claim 1 in *Diehr* recites, in pertinent part:

1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: providing said computer with a database for said press... repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure... repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence.

The *Diehr* claim strategy focused on how to describe an abstract mathematical expression in a manner that provided significant machine control steps. Of paramount importance was to avoid the trap of *Parker v. Flook*, where the claim was characterized as reciting insignificant post-solution activity. As such, *Diehr* provided detailed machine control steps, such as "opening the press automatically" when the compared calculated cure time was equivalent to the elapsed time in the tire mold. *Diehr* should be used where the software invention involves systems or methods using an output signal to control the operations of a machine (other than the computer itself), such as an engine, a printer, a heater, etc., and the software improves the internal operations of that controlled device. Evidence of a method that achieves the claimed result is still important in developing a patentable claim.

**FOLLOW THESE THREE STEPS**

**Step 1: Develop a Set of Proposed Claims**

Using guidance from the 12 cases discussed above, treat your 101 rejection as a stand-alone issue. A successful response to a PTO rejection may require a case-law-justified approach aimed at giving the Examiner a legal basis on which to justify withdrawal. According to *Diamond v. Diehr*, the first step is to compare your specification to some of the drafting factors set out below and, if possible, amend your claims to better match or amplify those factors. It may be helpful in working with some Examiners to use the amended claims as part of a draft proposal submitted in advance of the interview.

**Step 2: Interview the Patent Examiner.**

Most PTO rejections apply the two-part *Alice* test in rather formalistic, conclusive, and somewhat vague terms. Since 101 rejections are case-law based, unlike 102 or 103 rejections, the practitioner may be left struggling with case law statements by the Examiner about what constitutes "an abstract idea" with few guideposts. Examiners are trained under the guidelines to issue clear rejections using case law support and examples. What they are not trained to do is assist the practitioner in developing claim language that would, in their estimation, overcome an abstract idea rejection. To some extent, this is not surprising, since many Examiners would conclude this is not part of their job. Fair enough. But as practitioners, there is also no reason why we cannot ask for their help, or at least cooperation, in developing claims that would pass Section 101 muster.

Interviews can help clear away some of the *Alice* "fog." For example, during interviews some Examiners have candidly indicated their utter confusion with the *Alice* test and the PTO’s voluminous guidelines. In some instances, they have admitted that they are looking for “any” good rationale to justify the claims under 101 case law. In other instances, Examiners have clear ideas about acceptable claim language under 101, but will not necessarily suggest alternative language. More informed Examiners may have favorite cases or approaches to language that provide clearer lines for consideration. For example, an Examiner may be particularly interested in seeing a control signal to an external device (following the tire mold control in *Diamond v. Diehr*), or some in-depth claim language exposing the processing algorithms or rules (following the technical rules that convinced the Federal Circuit that the GUI in *McRO v. Bandai* involved technical software), or a good discussion regarding how and why the claims solve a technical problem that has hitherto not been addressed by the prior art (e.g., where the captive website solved a technical problem on the Internet in *DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com*). Finally, some of the more knowledgeable Examiners are looking for guidance from particular Federal Circuit decisions they find to be illustrative as a basis for supporting their rejection (or possible allowance). In any event, only a conversation with the Examiner will efficiently uncover his or her thinking (or bias) on the subject and at a minimum help clarify how to respond to a rejection.

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Out of Wonderland from Diehr to Aatrix: 3 Steps to Overcoming 101 Rejections • 11
The Berkheimer Court analyzed claims 1 and 4 under Alice step 1 and concluded that they recited the abstract concepts of parsing and storing data. Under Alice step 2, the Court looked at whether or not the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible concept. In construing claim 1, the Court concluded that it did not disclose any of the unconventional activities disclosed in the specification (which the inventor admitted existed for years before his patent). However, claim 4 recites a “reconciled object structure” which the patent specification explained involved a one-to-many editing capability that substantially reduces efforts to update files, and which is described as unconventional. The Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether or not claims 4–7 performed well-understood, routine, and conventional activities or whether they were transformative unconventional techniques that improve computer functionality. The Court concluded that facts pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art does not necessarily mean it was well-understood, routine, and conventional. The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment on claims 4–7 and remanded for further fact finding.

For practitioners, Berkheimer provides a basis for challenging unsupported conclusions by the Examiner that the claims recite conventional use of hardware. More critically, Berkheimer also can support a challenge to such a conclusion by the Examiner even when the Examiner does cite to some prior art. Berkheimer, however, may also be seen as an outlier, and it well may be further tested en banc.

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### CASE 12


**Factual Basis Required for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal under 101**

The Aatrix decision follows Berkheimer regarding the proper factual and procedural basis required by the Federal Circuit to warrant early dismissal—in this case under F.R. 12(b)(6). The technology in Aatrix relates to systems for creating viewable forms and reports. Representative claim 1 reads in pertinent part as follows:

> A data processing system for designing, creating, and importing data into, a viewable form viewable by the user of the data processing system, comprising:
>
> a form file that models the physical representation of an original paper form;
>
> a form file creation program that imports a background image from an original form;
>
> a data file containing data from a user application for populating the viewable form;
>
> and a form viewer program... to perform calculations, allow the user of the data processing system to review and change the data, and create viewable forms and reports.

At the District Court, defendant Green Shades moved to dismiss under Section 101 as the claims were “not directed to any tangible embodiment.” The Federal Circuit first analyzed claim 1 and found that it was tangible since it fulfilled one of the four statutory categories under Section 101 by containing a data processing system, a means for viewing changing data, and a means for viewing forms. The Court then found error in the District Court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint since the proposed complaint added specific allegations that are directed to improvements over the prior art that improve the functioning of computers. Moreover, the Court followed its reasoning in Berkheimer concluding that there was insufficient basis for the District Court to decide under Alice step 2 that the data file limitation was well understood and routine. The dismissal was vacated and remanded, although with Judge Reyna’s strongly worded dissent, it would come as no surprise that Berkheimer and Aatrix would be reviewed en banc. For practitioners, AATRIX also provides, at least for the time being, a basis (like Berkheimer) for challenging unsupported conclusions by the Examiner that the claims recite conventional use of hardware.

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### FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS UNDER ALICE STEP 1: THE “FILTER TEST”

#### CASE 2

**DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014): Internet Technological Improvements**

DDR Holdings involved a patent covering Internet technology regarding a composite web page. According to the Court, the claimed system was patent eligible because it solved a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology and specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. Claim 13 in DDR recites in pertinent part:

> 13. An e-commerce outsourcing system comprising:
> a) a data store including a look and feel description associated with a host web page having a link correlated with a commerce object; and
> b) a computer processor coupled to the data store and in communication through the Internet with the host web page and programmed, upon receiving an indication that the link has been activated by a visitor computer in Internet communication with the host web page, to serve a composite web page to the visitor computer with[i] a look and feel based on the look and feel description in the data store and with content based on the commerce object associated with[i] the link.

According to the Court, the claimed system solved a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology and specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. In its claim analysis, the Federal Circuit was careful to differentiate the DDR claims from examples of prior art manual systems, such as the brick and mortar kiosk within a store (exemplified in Judge Mayer’s dissent). The Court also distinguished the DDR claims from those in its Ultramercial decision which were found to be abstract and ineligible.7 The claims in DDR did more than broadly and generically describe use of the Internet, and they did not preempt the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same. The Court concluded that the claims recited a specific way to automate creation of a composite web page by an “outsource provider” that incorporates elements from multiple sources in order to solve a problem faced by websites on the Internet. While the claims were not technologically complex, they were nonetheless specific and thus more technologically justifiable—since they described “how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result.” From a claim-drafting perspective, a useful application of DDR is to develop a claim recitation that avoids preemption by breaking down the invention into processing steps that collectively recite interacting with Internet data, developing a composite construct, describing how data is used to create that construct, and explaining how the processing steps are activated.

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7. **Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 773 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2014)**
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Logical Improvement in Computer Database

In Enfish v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit found that a new logical organization for a database was patent eligible under Step 1 of Alice, even though all of the improvements were tied to the database’s internal logic. The Court in Enfish emphasized that the key question is whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or instead on a process in which computers are invoked merely as a tool. As in its later decision in Trading Tech (see below, Note 11), the Court was convinced that the claims at issue improved the functionality of the computer, or, more specifically, the computer database. However, Enfish differs from Trading Tech in that it is the organizational logic of the database, rather than a software process modifying the operations of display hardware, that ultimately carried the day. Enfish claim 17 exemplifies this in pertinent part below:

17. A data storage and retrieval system for a computer memory, comprising:
   means for configuring said memory according to a logical table, said logical table
   including:
   a plurality of logical rows, each said logical row including an object identification number (OID)…;
   a plurality of logical columns intersecting said plurality of logical rows to define a plurality
   of logical cells…, and
   means for indexing data stored in said table.

The Enfish Court found particular meaning in the means plus function claim language covering the self-referential feature, which while not explicit in the claim language itself, is part of the “means for configuring” term as defined in the specification. Thus the Court was more readily able to tie technical description in the specification to the claim since it had a narrower range of equivalents.

The Court also relied on the improvements over the prior art that rendered the computer database more efficient and provided reasons why it was thus. It was the technological aspects of the patent description and their differentiation from the prior art that allowed Enfish to avoid the dilemma striking other patents: the lack of a detailed technological reason tied to computer hardware performance that distinguishes the invention over the prior art. In sum, Enfish was written from the inside—the internal logical operations of a computer database were described from a technological perspective, not from the viewpoint of the end user. Enfish therefore is a good case to use to the extent there are internal logic features that can be tied to arguments of improvement in computer functionality over the prior art.

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CASE 10

Amdocs v. Openet Telecom, 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Improved Computer Accounting Program

The invention in Amdocs involves a system which allows network service providers to account for and bill for Internet protocol (“IP”) network communications and includes information source modules, gatherers, a central event manager, a central database, a user interface, servers, and terminals. Representative claim 1 recites:

1. A computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium for processing network accounting information comprising:
   computer code for receiving from a first source a first network accounting record;
   computer code for correlating the first network accounting record with accounting information available from a second source; and
   computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.

The Court concluded that claim 1 was narrowly drawn to not preempt generic enhancement of data and instead purposely arranges the components in a distributed architecture to achieve a technological solution specific to computer networks. More specifically, the distributed architecture of the claims solved the technological problem of large record flows to a central location by enhancing the distributed data matching capabilities of the network. Although the subcomponents were generic, the claims have them working together in a new distributed manner. As such, the distributed architecture provides “something more” than the performance of well-understood routine and conventional activities previously known in the industry. The Court compared the claim at issue favorably with those of Bascom and DDR Holdings which were technical improvements over the prior art and served to improve the performance of the system itself.

CASE 11


Berkheimer is a departure from other Federal Circuit cases in that it offers a new weapon against those PTO rejections that conclude, without support, that the invention merely computerizes well-understood, routine, and conventional activities.

The patent at issue relates to processing and archiving files in a digital asset management system. Pertinent portions of claims 1 and 4 of the Berkheimer patent are set forth below:

1. A method of archiving an item comprising in a computer processing system:
   presenting the item to a parser…;
   parsing the item into a plurality of multi-part object structures…;
   evaluating the object structures…;
   presenting an evaluated object structure for manual reconciliation…

4. The method as in claim 1 which includes storing a reconciled object structure in the archive without substantial redundancy.
In Bascom, the Court found that, under Alice filtering step 1, the invention was an "abstract idea" because it involved filtering, which is a "long-standing, well-known method for organizing human behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract." However, the claims as a whole recited a discrete implementation of an abstract idea that was not abstract—along with the McRO, DDR and Trading Techs (non-precedential)¹ line of cases.

DECISIONS FINDING SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY UNDER ALICE STEP 2: AN INVENTIVE CONCEPT THAT TRANSFORMS AN ABSTRACT IDEA INTO A PATENT ELIGIBLE INVENTION

CASE 9

Bascom Global Internet Services v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Content Filtering Using Remote ISP

Bascom involves 1997-era customizable filtering on a remote Internet service provider ("ISP") server for multiple Internet accounts. Claim 1 recites an individually customizable filter, as follows:

1. A content filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an Internet computer network by individual controlled access network accounts, said filtering system comprising:
   a. local client computer generating network access requests for said individual controlled access network accounts;
   b. at least one filtering scheme; and
   c. a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said Internet computer network, said ISP server associating each said network account to at least one filtering scheme and at least one set of filtering elements, said ISP server further receiving said network access requests from said client computer and executing said associated filtering scheme utilizing said associated set of logical filtering elements.

In Bascom, the Court noted that the Core Wireless display was an improvement over prior art interfaces which had many deficits relating to efficient functioning, and that the invention improved the efficiency of the mobile device. For practitioners, Core Wireless provides another technology example of a GUI claim that was found to be non-abstract—along with the McRO, DDR and Trading Techs (non-precedential)¹ line of cases.

The McRO court was impressed that processing rules tied to the automation of lip synchronization solved a technical problem—automating face animation using specified rules and morph weights. The Court was satisfied, as in Diehr, that the problem being solved was not abstract, even though the process was entirely performed by software operating on a general purpose computer. What appeared to be compelling to the McRO court was that the lip synchronization rules were detailed and presented through an approach that could not be accomplished manually, and solved a technological problem in the art.

To adequately capture the technological rules evidenced in McRO, it is important to write the application and draft claims describing the software from a technologist standpoint or, stated differently, avoid description of the software from the perspective of an end user. The software should be broken down and described in detail such that a programmer would understand, at almost the pseudo code level, the internal logic of the software. From this level of description, technical rules, such as those described and claimed in McRO, will be more easily ascertained.

It is important to distinguish McRO from other rules-based software method claims that are directed to the analysis of information that could be tied to the steps that people go through in their minds. For example, in the Federal Circuit’s FairWarning® decision, method claims were drawn to computer software rules for the analysis of records of human activity in order to detect suspicious behavior. The claim in FairWarning recites in pertinent part:

1. A method of detecting improper access of a patient’s protected health information (PHI) in a computer environment, the method comprising:
   a. generating a rule for monitoring audit log data representing at least one of transactions or accesses; and
   b. applying the rule to the audit log data to determine if an event has occurred, the event occurring if the at least one criterion has been met;

The McRO decision provides the best legal rationale supporting such claims. Claim 1 in McRO provides in pertinent part:

1. A method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional characters comprising:
   a. obtaining a first set of rules that define output morph weight set stream...
   b. obtaining a timed data file of phonemes having a plurality of sub-sequences;
   c. generating an intermediate stream of output morph weight sets and a plurality of transition parameters between two adjacent morph weight sets...;
   d. generating a final stream of output morph weight sets... and
   e. applying said final stream of output morph weight sets to a sequence of animated characters to produce lip synchronization and facial expression control of said animated characters.

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   d. generating a final stream of output morph weight sets... and
   e. applying said final stream of output morph weight sets to a sequence of animated characters to produce lip synchronization and facial expression control of said animated characters.
Like McRO, the claims in FairWarning recite detailed processing rules. In FairWarning, however, the Court likened the rules to manual techniques for logging data already in use that were merely computerized. The Court further distinguished McRO in that the rules in FairWarning were directed to the analysis of gathered data rather than improving a technological computer process. The Court also characterized the claims as merely implementing an old practice in a new environment, which the Court held to be dealing with “the same questions...that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries.”

**CASE 5**

**Thales Visionix Inc., v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017):**

**Improved Efficiency Using Inertial Sensors**

The patent in Thales Visionix involved the use of a new system of inertial sensors that directly measure the gravitational field of a platform frame and allow positional information to be calculated without reference to vehicle attitude or position of the moving platform. The sensors thus measure position and orientation more accurately than the prior art. System claim 1 recites in pertinent part:

1. A system for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving reference frame, comprising:
   a. a first inertial sensor mounted on the tracked object;
   b. a second inertial sensor mounted on the moving reference frame;
   c. an element adapted to receive signals from said first and second inertial sensors...to determine an orientation of the object relative to the moving reference frame....

The Court first analogized claim 1 to the claims in Diehr, in that both claim sets utilize mathematical equations to create an improved technological system: in Thales Visionix, the system “reduces errors in an inertial system that tracks an object on a moving platform,” and therefore “use[s] inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors.” As such, the claims were not purely directed to a patent ineligible natural law or abstract idea, but to a “useful technique to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform.” The Court then drew a parallel to Enfish, in that Enfish’s technique made the internal operations of a database more efficient, just as Thales Visionix’s new technique for using sensors to track an object on a moving platform improved efficiency. As a consequence, the Thales claims survived Alice step 1. For cases where known hardware elements are used in a new system that improves overall system efficiencies, Thales provides good legal basis for supporting arguments countering a 101 rejection.

**CASE 7**

**Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 2018 WL 341882 (Fed. Cir. 2018):**

**Improved Virus Scan**

The patent at issue in Finjan provides a method that improves computer security where a security profile is attached to the downloaded item. The independent method claim in Finjan recites:

A method comprising:
1. receiving by an inspector a Downloadable;
2. generating by the inspector a first Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in the received Downloadable;
3. linking by the inspector the first Downloadable security profile to the Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.

The Court distinguished Finjan’s method from the virus scan claimed in Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec10 because Finjan’s “Downloadable security profile” deployed a behavioral-based scan, rather than a direct code comparison, which enabled the computer scan to be applied more flexibly and set up more efficiently. The Court also likened this feature to the self-referential database in Enfish since the profile record enabled a computer to do things it could not do before—tailor security to different users and identify threats before files reach a user’s computer. Finally, the Court further distinguished the case from Apple, Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in that while the generic idea of summarizing information certainly existed prior to the invention, these claims are directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices rather than using conventional user interface methods. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:

10. Apple, Inc. v. Amoretti, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Intellectual Ventures, see note 9.
Like McRO, the claims in FairWarning recite detailed processing rules. In FairWarning, however, the Court likened the rules to manual techniques for logging data already in use that were merely computerized. The Court further distinguished McRO in that the rules in FairWarning were directed to the analysis of gathered data rather than improving a technological computer process. The Court also characterized the claims as merely implementing an old practice in a new environment, which the Court held to be dealing with “the same questions that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries.”

**CASE 5**


The patent in Thales Visionix involved the use of a new system of inertial sensors that directly measure the gravitational field of a platform and allow positional information to be calculated without reference to vehicle attitude or position of the moving platform. The sensors thus measure position and orientation more accurately than the prior art. System claim 1 recites in pertinent part:

1. A system for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving reference frame, comprising:
   a. first inertial sensor mounted on the tracked object;
   b. second inertial sensor mounted on the moving reference frame;
   c. element adapted to receive signals from said first and second inertial sensors…to determine an orientation of the object relative to the moving reference frame.

The Court first analogized claim 1 to the claims in Diehr, in that both claim sets utilize mathematical equations to create an improved technological system: in Thales Visionix, the system “reduces errors in an inertial system that tracks an object on a moving platform,” and therefore “use[s] inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors.” As such, the claims were not purely directed to a patent ineligible natural law or abstract idea, but to a “useful technique to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform.” The Court then drew a parallel to Enfish, in that Enfish’s technique made the internal operations of a database more efficient, just as Thales Visionix’s new technique for using sensors to track an object on a moving platform improved efficiency. As a consequence, the Thales claims survived Alice step 1. For cases where known hardware elements are used in a new system that improves overall system efficiencies, Thales provides good legal basis for supporting arguments countering a 101 rejection.

**CASE 6**

Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017): Improved Computer Memory System Is Not Abstract

The Visual Memory Court follows the Enfish/Thales line of opinions. Like the patents at issue in Enfish and Thales, the Visual Memory patent specification discusses advantages offered by a technological improvement. The patent at issue in Visual Memory involves a self-configuring programmable cache memory system that can be tailored to accommodate different processors without compromising individual processor performance. Claim 1 of the Visual Memory patent recites in pertinent part:

1. A computer memory system connectable to a processor and having one or more programmable operational characteristics, said characteristics being defined through configuration by said computer based on the type of said processor…said system comprising:
   a. main memory connected to said bus; and
   b. a cache connected to said bus, wherein a programmable operational characteristic of said system determines a type of data stored by said cache.

In Visual Memory, the Court first asked whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality or an abstract idea. Citing Enfish and Thales, the Court concluded that the memory system at issue was a technological improvement in the capabilities of computing. In its analysis, the Court relied heavily on the specification’s description of the improvements over prior art memory systems and also contrasted the technology bound description in Visual Memory with other cases which instead used hardware in a conventional manner and invoked a computer merely as a tool. Finally, the Court responded to the dissent, which characterized the invention as a black box solution, by relying on the detailed appendix of computer code, and held that the sufficiency of disclosure to one of ordinary skill in the art was not an inquiry under Section 101. For practitioners, Visual Memory can be cited when new data analysis can be tied to improved internal computer functionality over the prior art.

**CASE 7**


The patent at issue in Finjan provides a method that improves computer security where a security profile is attached to the downloaded item. The independent method claim in Finjan recites:

A method comprising:
   receiving by an inspector a Downloadable;
   generating by the inspector a first Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in the received Downloadable;
   linking by the inspector the first Downloadable security profile to the Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.

The Court distinguished Finjan’s method from the virus scan claimed in Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec because Finjan’s “Downloadable security profile” deployed a behavioral-based scan, rather than a direct code comparison, which enabled the computer scan to be applied more flexibly and set up more efficiently. The Court also likened this feature to the self-referential database in Enfish since the profile record enabled a computer to do things it could not do before—tailor security to different users and identify threats before files reach a user’s computer. Finally, the Court further distinguished the case from Apple, Affinity Labs, and Intellectual Ventures by finding that the claims did not recite the result but described generating a security profile and linking it to a Downloadable. As a result, the claim challenged as 101 was denied because the claim involved mobile device display having an application summary window showing common functions and data which can be reached directly from the main menu in two steps: first launch the main menu, second, launch the summary window which displays the application in an unlaunched state. The Court found that while the generic idea of summarizing information certainly existed prior to the invention, these claims are directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices rather than using conventional user interface methods. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:

10. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Intellectual Ventures, see note 9.
1. computing device comprising a display screen, the computing device being configured to display on the screen a menu listing one or more applications, and additionally being configured to display on the screen an application summary that can be reached directly from the menu, and wherein the application summary is displayed while the one or more applications are in an un-launched state.

The Court noted that the Core Wireless display was an improvement over prior art interfaces which had many deficits relating to efficient functioning, and that the invention improved the efficiency of the mobile device. For practitioners, Core Wireless provides another technology example of a GUI claim that was found to be non-abstract—along with the McRO, DDR and Trading Techs (non-precedential) case 

### DECISIONS FINDING SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY UNDER ALICE STEP 2: AN INVENTIVE CONCEPT THAT TRANSFORMS AN ABSTRACT IDEA INTO A PATENT ELIGIBLE INVENTION

**CASE 9**

**Bascom Global Internet Services v. AT&T Mobility LLC,**

827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Content Filtering Using Remote ISP

Bascom involves 1997-era customizable filtering on a remote Internet service provider ("ISP") server for multiple Internet accounts. Claim 1 recites an individually customizable filter, as follows:

1. A content filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an Internet computer network by individual controlled access network accounts, said filtering system comprising:
   - a local client computer generating network access requests for said individual controlled access network accounts;
   - at least one filtering scheme;
   - a plurality of sets of logical filtering elements; and
   - a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said Internet computer network, said ISP server associating each said network account at least one filtering scheme and at least one set of filtering elements, said ISP server further receiving said network access requests from said client computer and executing said associated filtering scheme utilizing said associated set of logical filtering elements.

In Bascom, the Court found that, under Alice filtering step 1, the invention was an "abstract idea" because it involved filtering, which is a "long-standing, well-known method for organizing human behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract." However, the claims as a whole recited a discrete implementation of an abstract idea that was a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. The inventive concept harnessed a specific process, not a general idea, for providing a technical improvement to content filtering.

**CASE 4**

**McRO, Inc. d/ba Planet Blue v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,**

837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Application of Rules to Improve a Technical Process

A lesson of McRO is that in the event the software invention produces a result that is only displayed or is otherwise internal to the operations of the computer itself, the software needs to include the application of technical rules in order to be deemed non-abstract. The Federal Circuit’s McRO decision provides the best legal rationale supporting such claims. Claim 1 in McRO provides in pertinent part:

1. A method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional characters comprising: obtaining a first set of rules that define output morph weight set stream... obtaining a timed data file of phonemes having a plurality of sub-sequences; generating an intermediate stream of output morph weight sets and a plurality of transition parameters between two adjacent morph weight sets...; generating a final stream of output morph weight sets... and applying said final stream of output morph weight sets to a sequence of animated characters to produce lip synchronization and facial expression control of said animated characters.

The McRO court was impressed that processing rules tied to the automation of lip synchronization solved a technical problem—automating face animation using specified rules and morph weights. The Court was satisfied, as in Diehr, that the problem being solved was not abstract, even though the process was entirely performed by software operating on a general purpose computer. What appeared to be compelling to the McRO court was that the lip synchronization rules were detailed and presented through an approach that could not be accomplished manually, and solved a technological problem in the art.

To adequately capture the technological rules evidenced in McRO, it is important to write the application and draft claims describing the software from a technologist standpoint or, stated differently, avoiding description of the software from the perspective of an end user. The software should be broken down and described in detail such that a programmer would understand, at almost the pseudo code level, the internal logic of the software. From this level of description, technical rules, such as those described and claimed in McRO, will be more easily ascertained.

It is important to distinguish McRO from other rules-based software method claims that are directed to the analysis of information that could be tied to the steps that people go through in their minds. For example, in the Federal Circuit’s FairWarning decision, method claims were drawn to computer software rules for the analysis of records of human activity in order to detect suspicious behavior. The claim in FairWarning recites in pertinent part:

1. A method of detecting improper access of a patient’s protected health information (PHI) in a computer environment, the method comprising:
   generating a rule for monitoring audit log data representing at least one of transactions or activities; applying the rule to the audit log data to determine if an event has occurred, the event occurring if the at least one criterion has been met; storing, in a memory, a hit if the event has occurred; and providing notification if the event has occurred.

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11. Of note is Trading Techs, Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 2016-1616, Fed. Apps. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017), a non-precedential Federal Circuit decision involving an improved computer display. In Trading Techs, the method claims describe software-operated displays of a structural geometric user interface ("GUI") for trading commodities. The Court found that the claims were directed to the operation of computer hardware and are not abstract so long as the claims are rooted in computer technology and overcome a problem specifically arising in computer technology. The method was found to be non-abstract because the software addresses and resolves "a specifically identified problem in the prior art relating to the speed, accuracy, and usability found in prior art GUIs that have no pre-electronic trading analog."
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Logical Improvement in Computer Database

In *Enfish v. Microsoft*, the Federal Circuit found that a new logical organization for a database was patent eligible under Step 1 of Alice, even though all of the improvements were tied to the database’s internal logic. The Court in *Enfish* emphasized that the key question is whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or instead on a process in which computers are invoked merely as a tool. As in its later decision in *Trading Tech* (see below, Note 11), the Court was convinced that the claims at issue improved the functionality of the computer, or, more specifically, the computer database. However, *Enfish* differs from *Trading Tech* in that it is the organizational logic of the database, rather than a software process modifying the operations of display hardware, that ultimately carried the day. *Enfish* claim 17 exemplifies this in pertinent part below:

17. A data storage and retrieval system for a computer memory, comprising:
   means for configuring said memory according to a logical table, said logical table including:
   a plurality of logical rows, each said logical row including an object identification number (OID)…;
   a plurality of logical columns intersecting said plurality of logical rows to define a plurality
   of logical cells…, and
   means for indexing data stored in said table.

The *Enfish* Court found particular meaning in the means plus function claim language covering the self-referential feature, which while not explicit in the claim language itself, is part of the “means for configuring” term as defined in the specification. Thus the Court was more readily able to tie technical description in the specification to the claim since it had a narrower range of equivalents.

The Court also relied on the improvements over the prior art that rendered the computer database more efficient and provided reasons why it was thus. It was the technological aspects of the patent description and their differentiation from the prior art that allowed *Enfish* to avoid the dilemma striking other patents: the lack of a detailed technological reason tied to computer hardware performance that distinguishes the invention over the prior art. In sum, *Enfish* was written from the inside—the internal logical operations of a computer database were described from a technological perspective, not from the viewpoint of the end user. *Enfish* therefore is a good case to use to the extent there are internal logic features that can be tied to arguments of improvement in computer functionality over the prior art.

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### CASE 3

#### Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Logical Improvement in Computer Database

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#### Note 11

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   a plurality of logical rows, each said logical row including an object identification number (OID)…;
   a plurality of logical columns intersecting said plurality of logical rows to define a plurality
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### CASE 10

#### Amdocs v. Openet Telecom, 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016): Improved Computer Accounting Program

The invention in *Amdocs* involves a system which allows network service providers to account for and bill for Internet protocol (“IP”) network communications and includes information source modules, gatherers, a central event manager, a central database, a user interface, servers, and terminals. Representative claim 1 recites:

1. A computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium for
   processing network accounting information comprising:
   computer code for receiving from a first source a first network accounting record;
   computer code for correlating the first network accounting record with accounting
   information available from a second source; and
   computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network
   accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.

The Court found particular meaning in the means plus function claim language covering the self-referential feature, which while not explicit in the claim language itself, is part of the “means for configuring” term as defined in the specification. Thus the Court was more readily able to tie technical description in the specification to the claim since it had a narrower range of equivalents.

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### CASE 11


*Berkheimer* is a departure from other Federal Circuit cases in that it offers a new weapon against those PTO rejections that conclude, without support, that the invention merely computerizes well-understood, routine, and conventional activities.

The patent at issue relates to processing and archiving files in a digital asset management system. Pertinent portions of claims 1 and 4 of the Berkheimer patent are set forth below:

1. A method of archiving an item comprising in a computer processing system:
   presenting the item to a parser…;
   evaluating the object structures…;
   presenting an evaluated object structure for manual reconciliation…

4. The method as in claim 1 which includes storing a reconciled object structure in the archive without substantial redundancy.
The Berkheimer Court analyzed claims 1 and 4 under Alice step 1 and concluded that they recited the abstract concepts of parsing and storing data. Under Alice step 2, the Court looked at whether or not the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible concept. In construing claim 1, the Court concluded that it did not disclose any of the unconventional activities disclosed in the specification (which the inventor admitted existed for years before his patent). However, claim 4 recites a “reconciled object structure” which the patent specification explained involved a one-to-many editing capability that substantially reduces efforts to update files, and which is described as unconventional. The Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether or not claims 4–7 performed well-understood, routine, and conventional activities or whether they were transformative unconventional techniques that improve computer functionality. The Court concluded that facts pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art does not necessarily mean it was well-understood, routine, and conventional. The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment on claims 4–7 and remanded for further fact finding.

For practitioners, Berkheimer provides a basis for challenging unsupported conclusions by the Examiner that the claims recite conventional use of hardware. More critically, Berkheimer also can support a challenge to such a conclusion by the Examiner even when the Examiner does cite to some prior art. Berkheimer, however, may also be seen as an outlier, and it well may be further tested en banc.

CASE 12


Factual Basis Required for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal under 101

The Aatrix decision follows Berkheimer regarding the proper factual and procedural basis required by the Federal Circuit to warrant early dismissal—in this case under F.R. 12(b)(6). The technology in Aatrix relates to systems for creating viewable forms and reports. Representative claim 1 reads in pertinent part as follows:

A data processing system for designing, creating, and importing data into, a viewable form file creation program that imports a background image from an original form file that models the physical representation of an original paper form …;

a form file containing data from a user application for populating the viewable form; and

a data processing system, comprising:

a form file creation program that imports a background image from an original form; …;

At the District Court, defendant Green Shades moved to dismiss under Section 101 as the claims were “not directed to any tangible embodiment.” The Federal Circuit first analyzed claim 1 and found that it was tangible since it fulfilled one of the four statutory categories under Section 101 by containing a data processing system, a means for viewing and specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. Claim 13 in DDR recites a basis for challenging unsupported conclusions by the Examiner that the claims recite conventional use of hardware.

According to the Court, the claimed system solved a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology and specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. In its claim analysis, the Federal Circuit was careful to differentiate the DDR claims from examples of prior art manual systems, such as the brick and mortar kiosk within a store (exemplified in Judge Mayer’s dissent). The Court also distinguished the DDR claims from those in its Ultramercial decision which were found to be abstract and ineligible. The claims in DDR did more than broadly and generically describe use of the Internet, and they did not preempt the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same. The Court concluded that the claims recited a specific way to automate creation of a composite web page by an "outsource provider" that incorporates elements from multiple sources in order to solve a problem faced by websites on the Internet. While the claims were not technologically complex, they were nonetheless specific and thus more technologically justifiable—since they described "how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result." From a claim-drafting perspective, a useful application of DDR is to develop a claim recitation that avoids preemption by breaking down the invention into processing steps that collectively recite interacting with Internet data, developing a composite construct, describing how data is used to create that construct, and explaining how the processing steps are activated.

7. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
The purpose of this paper is to draw some conclusions about how to effectively handle software inventions in the post-Alice era before the PTO. Set out below are a few steps that may help alleviate some of the confusion and hopefully provide guidance in overcoming a 101 rejection.

**KNOW THESE 12 CASES**

In developing arguments concerning an outstanding 101 rejection, it is important to begin by knowing those cases that are supportive of patent eligibility. Here is a shorthand guide to the one Supreme Court case and the 11 Federal Circuit decisions that have upheld patent eligibility. The Federal Circuit decisions are organized by which part of the two-step Alice test allowed the claims in those decisions to pass legal muster, then by date.

**CASE 1**

*Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175 (1981): Technically Significant Control of Another Device for Improved Performance

*Diamond v. Diehr* predates Alice by 37 years, but represents the only time the U.S. Supreme Court recognized computer software claims as being patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Diehr is still good law and should be used as a basis for supporting your claims, if possible.

The claims at play in *Diehr* involved the computerized application of the 19th-century Arrhenius equation to automated timing and operation of a rubber tire mold. By way of example, claim 1 in *Diehr* recites, in pertinent part:

1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
   providing said computer with a database for said press...
   repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure...
   repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
   opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence.

The *Diehr* claim strategy focused on how to describe an abstract mathematical expression in a manner that provided significant machine control steps. Of paramount importance was to avoid the trap of *Parker v. Flook* where the claim was characterized as reciting insignificant post-solution activity. As such, *Diehr* provided detailed machine control steps, such as “opening the press automatically” when the compared calculated cure time was equivalent to the elapsed time in the tire mold. *Diehr* should be used where the software invention involves systems or methods using an output signal to control the operations of a machine (other than the computer itself), such as an engine, a printer, a heater, etc., and the software improves the internal operations of that controlled device. Evidence of a control signal alone will not necessarily meet Alice, but the control signal combined with an argument explaining why the machine’s operation is improved by the invention as claimed when compared to manual methods is likely to be persuasive to examiners. For instance, if the claimed software involves control of an automobile engine, then the use of a computer and equations tied to the computer along with an argument explaining why such use improves technical engine performance over the prior art, and why the same result could not be accomplished manually, should help to establish that the claimed invention is patent eligible.

**FOLLOW THESE THREE STEPS**

**Step 1: Develop a Set of Proposed Claims**

Using guidance from the 12 cases discussed above, treat your 101 rejection as a stand-alone issue. A successful response to a PTO rejection may require a case-law justified approach aimed at giving the Examiner a legal basis on which to justify withdrawal. Accordingly, the first step is to compare your specification to some of the drafting factors set out below and, if possible, amend your claims to better match or amplify those factors. It may be helpful in working with some Examiners to use the amended claims as part of a draft proposal submitted in advance of the interview.

**Step 2: Interview the Patent Examiner.**

Most PTO rejections apply the two-part Alice test in rather formalistic, conclusive, and somewhat vague terms. Since 101 rejections are case-law based, unlike 102 or 103 rejections, the practitioner may be left struggling with case law statements by the Examiner about what constitutes “an abstract idea” with few guideposts. Examiners are trained under the guidelines to issue clear rejections using case law support and examples. What they are not trained to do is assist the practitioner in developing claim language that would, in their estimation, overcome an abstract idea rejection. To some extent, this is not surprising, since many Examiners would conclude this is not part of their job. Fair enough. But as practitioners, there is also no reason why we cannot ask for their help, or at least cooperation, in developing claims that would pass Section 101 muster.

Interviews can help clear away some of the Alice “fog.” For example, during interviews some Examiners have candidly indicated their utter confusion with the Alice test and the PTO’s voluminous guidelines. In some instances, they have admitted that they are looking for “any” good rationale to justify the claims under 101 case law. In other instances, Examiners have clear ideas about acceptable claim language under 101, but will not necessarily suggest alternative language. More informed Examiners may have favorite cases or approaches to language that provide clearer lines for consideration. For example, an Examiner may be particularly interested in seeing a control signal to an external device (following the tire mold control in *Diamond v. Diehr*), or some in-depth claim language exposing the processing algorithms or rules (following the technical rules that convinced the Federal Circuit that the GUI in *McRO v. Bandai* involved technical software), or a good discussion regarding how and why the claims solve a technical problem that has hitherto not been addressed by the prior art (e.g., where the captive website solved a technical problem on the Internet in *DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com*). Finally, some of the more knowledgeable Examiners are looking for guidance from particular Federal Circuit decisions they find to be illustrative as a basis for supporting their rejection (or possible allowance). In any event, only a conversation with the Examiner will efficiently uncover his or her thinking (or bias) on the subject and at a minimum help clarify how to respond to a rejection.

**Step 3: Amend to Overcome the Rejection.**

Using guidance from the 12 cases discussed above, treat your 101 rejection as a stand-alone issue. A successful response to a PTO rejection may require a case-law justified approach aimed at giving the Examiner a legal basis on which to justify withdrawal. Accordingly, the first step is to compare your specification to some of the drafting factors set out below and, if possible, amend your claims to better match or amplify those factors. It may be helpful in working with some Examiners to use the amended claims as part of a draft proposal submitted in advance of the interview.

Step 3: Tie Amended Claims and Your Remarks to Relevant 101 Cases

Regardless of the Examiner’s attitude, it can be useful to draft your application or amend your claims to follow a clear case-law based foundation. This means following not only the Alice test in application, but also those cases where claims were determined to pass muster by courts whether applying the Alice test or Diamond v. Diehr. Moreover, it may be critical to shape your arguments based on how the invention has improved over the prior art from a technological standpoint. This is to avoid Alice step 2: the argument that all the patent does is computerize the prior art using standard components merely as “tools” to carry out the abstract idea itself. To the extent you want the claims to be tied to algorithms, rules, or structure in the specification, include means plus function language (“MPF”) which is interpreted more narrowly. The MPF format was found to be helpful in Enfish since it provided a shortcut to ample technical support language in the patent specification. And if the Examiner rejects the claims based on mere conclusions, then by all means use the Berkheimer case, which to date has not made it to the ever-growing PTO guidelines. Finally, you may not be able to tie the claims to the algorithms and rules if they are not disclosed in the original specification, so, when possible, include specific technical features during patent drafting—details that might have been left out in a pre-Alice world. You may even want to consider adding source code in an Appendix (a key consideration in the Visual Memory case), which could provide flexibility later on in the event you want to avoid a new matter rejection.

CONCLUSION

Post-Alice, the PTO is aggressively rejecting software claims under the Alice two-part test, the parameters of which many Examiners are still trying to understand. By following the steps discussed here, you have the best shot at overcoming a non-statutory subject matter rejection:

1. Interview the Examiner to see if he or she has specific claim terms in mind.
2. Read the specification to find:
   a. Technological details of the claimed invention;
   b. Descriptions of the control of external hardware;
   c. Specific processing rules or logic that improve hardware performance;
   d. Descriptions of improved display interfaces; and
   e. Clear differences from non-computer/non-internet practices.
3. Revise claims with specificity, including using means or step plus function language where technological details are important, and avoiding the recitation of mere processing results.
4. Tie remarks into specific Federal Circuit cases.
5. Dispute conclusory statements asking for evidence by the Examiner by citing Berkheimer or by providing evidence through an expert affidavit.
6. If claims are allowed without remarks, add legal justification in subsequent filings to support claims on appeal or in litigation.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2014, the United States Supreme Court in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. removed the presumption that software operating on standard hardware components could avoid being deemed an abstract idea, even though the claim language was sufficiently tied to a machine. Many in the industry saw Alice as a turning point marking the dramatic rollback of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101 for many software-based inventions.

Applying the two-step test developed in the biotechnology decision Mayo, Alice extended the Mayo test to determine patent eligibility for computer software inventions: step one, known as the “filter step,” is whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-eligible concept, such as an abstract idea. If the claims are deemed abstract in step one, then the inquiry passes to step two, which tests whether the elements of the claim contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea determined in filter step one into a patent-eligible invention. To determine step two, the court may look at individual claim limitations or the ordered combination of claim limitations to test whether there is “something more” than the performance of well-understood routine and conventional activities previously performed manually or already known in the industry. While the Alice court noted that software using conventional computer hardware to produce new functions is not subject-matter eligible, the Court did not provide specific guidance on when a claim reciting those conventional components is or is not patent eligible.

Not surprisingly, Alice has led to some confusion, among both practitioners and patent examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), about how to apply it from a practical standpoint. For practitioners attempting to patent software, there is plenty of guidance. First, a substantial body of District Court and Federal Circuit cases have construed Alice. Because many of the patents in those cases were written before Alice was decided, many of the earlier cases found against the patentee. Second, there have been a number of cases (especially since the beginning of 2018) that have gone the other way, giving patent owners a glimpse of hope and, more critically, cogent arguments to counter subject matter eligibility rejections by the PTO.

All the same, it is hard to draw clear conclusions from post-Alice case law other than that the cases are heavily fact dependent and no bright-line test appears evident. Indeed as the Federal Circuit recently wrote: “[t]he problem with articulating a single, universal definition of ‘abstract idea’ is that it is difficult to fashion a workable definition to be applied to as-yet unknown cases with as-yet unknown inventions. Instead of a definition, then, the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen...”

Closely following post-alice case developments, the PTO issued various examination guidelines and quick reference tools in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. Not surprisingly, the PTO guidelines are lengthy—over 200 pages of instruction, examples, and reference tools in multiple documents including the life sciences. The guidelines, which were released over time, attempt to create order out of cases that are often too confusing, inconsistent, and hard to follow to develop a clear picture. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that some patent examiners are just as confused as practitioners when it comes to dealing with Section 101 and computer software-related inventions.

3. It should be noted that this confusion also extends to non-U.S. practitioners. For example, prior to Alice, the European Patent Office (“EPO”) was seen as having the more restrictive test for software patent eligibility. Despite the express provision excluding the patentability of software under Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”), the EPO has applied a de minimus approach favoring claims evidencing a “technical character,” as long as “any demonstration and degree of ‘technical character’ is shown, such as the ‘mere use’ of a computer.” Since Alice, however, the U.S. subject matter test is stricter—which some practitioners see as a role reversal for the United States.
4. Amgen, 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
5. Specifically, the PTO issued: 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility; July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility; May 2016 Memo; Enfish and TLI Memo; Rapid Litigation Management and Jaquarson Memo; WIPO and BSA/CMA Memo; Abstract Idea Examples 1-8; Nature-based Product Examples 9-18; Abstract Idea Examples 21-27; Life Sciences Examples 28-33; Business Method Examples 34-36; Index of Examples; Summary of 2014 EU; Summary of July 2015 Update; Decisions holding claims eligible and identifying abstract ideas; and Chart of subject matter eligibility court decisions.
For over 30 years, Jon Grossman has practiced in the areas of patent law, licensing work, and copyright with an emphasis on computer software issues, including:

- significant commercial licensing experience encompassing all aspects of contracting, including inbound and outbound licenses, development agreements, Internet contracting, and copyright related agreements
- significant government contract licensing experience concerning issues regarding technical data rights and subject inventions
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- providing clients a full range of IP counseling with a business focus in the areas of strategic acquisitions, outsourcing, and joint ventures and enforcement
- assisting patent clients overcome subject matter eligibility rejections at the U.S. Patent Office in the post-Alice context

Additionally, he has worked closely with clients in obtaining financing from venture capitalists.

Jon also has extensive experience regarding Internet legal issues including IP enforcement and defense issues.

Jon is recognized as a leader in issues concerning business method patent protection and intellectual property opinion making. He co-authored *Intellectual Property Legal Opinions*, Second Edition (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business), the leading treatise on IP counseling, which has been updated annually since 1999.
Out of Wonderland from *Diehr* to *Aatrix*: 3 Steps to Overcoming 101 Rejections

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