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In late October, President Donald Trump embarked on a weeklong tour of Asia and returned having secured a temporary truce in the U.S.-China trade war, and a number of economic deals with Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

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These deals demonstrate not only a strengthening of trade and investment ties between the United States and Asia, but also underscore the need for companies to track diplomatic developments that may impact their supply chains, especially those for sensitive technologies and scarce resources.

Washington and Beijing negotiate yearlong trade truce. 

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After months of escalating trade tensions, President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in South Korea to negotiate a trade détente. While the two sides did not ink a formal trade deal, Washington and Beijing agreed to temporarily pause certain tit-for-tat countermeasures imposed in recent months.

In particular, China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) confirmed that <a href="https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/SpokesmansRemarks/art/2025/art_d3b018b922a4458989e43a46a04be6fe.html">Beijing would</a>:&nbsp;

adjust its retaliatory tariff measures and extend certain tariff exclusions for U.S. imports into China;

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<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/china-starts-work-easing-rare-earth-export-rules-short-trump-hopes-sources-say-2025-11-07/">suspend</a>, for a period of one year, new <a href="https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2025/art_16a0593dcadd4030959c3691cf39bb26.html">export restrictions</a> on the export of rare earths and permanent magnets (during the suspension, China will “study and refine specific plans” to later implement such export controls);

<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/china-suspends-port-fees-us-linked-ships-year-2025-11-10/">suspend</a>, for a period of one year, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-us-port-fees-a67996522d4705e663e37515fa45baf5">port fees</a> on American-owned, -operated, and/or             -built ships;

<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/10/world/asia/china-fentanyl-united-states-trade.html">cooperate</a> on anti-fentanyl trafficking efforts;

expand agricultural trade with the United States; and

“properly resolve TikTok-related issues” with Washington. 

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Notably, a White House <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china/">Fact Sheet</a>—released after President Trump returned to the United States—suggests that China will also:&nbsp;

<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-suspends-ban-exports-gallium-germanium-antimony-us-2025-11-09/">issue</a> general licenses for exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite to U.S. end users and suppliers;

remove (or suspend the addition of) certain U.S. companies to China’s end user and unreliable entity lists;

terminate its concurrent <a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/pressroom/2025-09/14/content_118077750.html">antidumping</a> and <a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/pressroom/2025-09/15/content_118078457.html">anti-discrimination</a> investigations into U.S. chips and chip policy, respectively; and

<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-grants-exemptions-export-curbs-nexperia-chips-civilian-use-2025-11-09/">allow</a>Nexperia, a Chinese-owned chip company headquartered in the Netherlands (subject to a recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgk21nng0vo">takeover</a> by the Dutch government), to export legacy chips worldwide.

In exchange for the above, the United States agreed to:&nbsp;

<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/modifying-duties-addressing-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">lower</a> fentanyl trafficking-related tariffs on Chinese imports from 20 percent to 10 percent, beginning November 10, 2025;

<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-consistent-with-the-economic-and-trade-arrangement-between-the-united-states-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">maintain</a> the 10 percent “reciprocal” tariff rate applicable to Chinese-origin goods through November 10, 2026;

<a href="https://www.blankrome.com/publications/bis-suspends-affiliates-rule-one-year-effective-november-10">suspend</a> the new “<a href="https://www.blankrome.com/publications/bis-adopts-long-awaited-affiliate-rule">Affiliates Rule</a>” recently issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations, beginning November 10, 2025;

<a href="https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19839.pdf?utm_campaign=pi+subscription+mailing+list&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=federalregister.gov">suspend</a> U.S. <a href="https://www.blankrome.com/publications/new-ustr-measures-target-chinese-maritime-sector-what-you-need-know">port fees</a> on Chinese-owned and -operated ships, beginning November 10, 2025; and

extend certain Section 301 tariff exclusions through November 10, 2026. 

Critically, because no written agreement yet exists between the United States and China, it is unclear whether either country will find the other’s actions satisfactory. Should one country not live up to expectations, it is possible that trade relations between the two countries could again deteriorate.&nbsp;

Following the discussions between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Xie Feng, China’s Ambassador to the United States, <a href="https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202511/t20251104_11746391.htm">heralded</a> the “recalibrating [of] the direction of bilateral relations” but warned that “Taiwan, democracy and human rights, path and system, and development rights are China’s four red lines.”&nbsp;

President Trump secures trade deals and investment commitments with Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. 

The United States also concluded deals with&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/10/28195/">Japan</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/10/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-brings-home-more-billion-dollar-deals-during-state-visit-to-the-republic-of-korea/">South Korea</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-kingdom-of-cambodia-on-reciprocal-trade/">Cambodia</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-malaysia-on-reciprocal-trade/">Malaysia</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/joint-statement-on-a-framework-for-a-united-states-thailand-agreement-on-reciprocal-trade/">Thailand</a>, and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/joint-statement-on-united-states-vietnam-framework-for-an-agreement-on-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade/">Vietnam</a>. Many of these deals involve sector commitments, described below.&nbsp;

Investment Commitments&nbsp;

Both Japan and South Korea have committed to large-scale investments in the United States aimed at bolstering energy, manufacturing, advanced technology, and supply chain resilience. These proposed public and private sector investments are part of Tokyo’s and Seoul’s commitment to invest $550 billion and <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115459650821125830">$350 billion</a>, respectively, in the United States.&nbsp;

Notably, South Korea—which had previously <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-cannot-pay-350-billion-us-tariff-deal-trump-suggests-top-aide-says-2025-09-27/">struggled to finalize</a> its July trade deal with the United States as a result of reported U.S. pressure to provide its investment “upfront”—will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/south-korea-gives-details-trade-deal-struck-with-us-2025-10-29/">invest</a> $20 billion annually, up to $200 billion, and designate another $150 billion for shipbuilding activities in the United States.&nbsp;

Malaysia likewise has agreed to “facilitate, to the extent practicable” investments worth $70 billion in the United States, while the United States has agreed to consider investment opportunities in both Malaysia and Cambodia through the U.S Export-Import Bank.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

Tariff Amendments

The reciprocal tariff rate for products imported into the United States from Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam remains the same as the rates announced in <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/06/2025-15010/further-modifying-the-reciprocal-tariff-rates">Executive Order (“EO”) 14326</a> (i.e., 15, 15, 19, 19, 19, and 20 percent, respectively).&nbsp;

Notably, the trade deals with Cambodia and Malaysia contain certain product-specific tariff exemptions based on Annex III to EO 14346, while the frameworks with Thailand and Vietnam state that the United States will, presumably at a later time, “identify products from the list set out in Annex III to [EO] 14346…to receive a zero percent reciprocal tariff rate.”

Shipbuilding Cooperation

The United States and Japan signed a non-binding <a href="https://www.mlit.go.jp/report/press/content/001966582.pdf">Memorandum of Cooperation</a> addressing shipbuilding efforts. Key commitments include the establishment of a Japan-U.S. Shipbuilding Working Group, bilateral expansions of shipbuilding capacity, enhanced education and training for shipyard workforces, and development of digital solutions.&nbsp;

As noted above, the United States and South Korea have agreed that South Korea will invest $150 billion to expand U.S. shipbuilding capacity, as part of its investment commitments. These investments will focus on modernizing U.S. shipyards and strengthening supply chains, shipyard automation, and infrastructure development.

These initiatives signal a coordinated approach to maritime industrial capacity, with South Korea’s partnership structured around substantial capital allocation and Japan’s collaboration formalized through a cooperative framework.&nbsp;

Science and Technology Frameworks

Both Japan and South Korea entered into non-binding Memoranda of Cooperation to advance science and technology. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/10/u-s-japan-technology-prosperity-deal/">U.S.-Japan Technology Prosperity Deal</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/10/u-s-korea-technology-prosperity-deal/">U.S.-Republic of Korea Technology Prosperity Deal</a> have overlapping commitments to accelerate AI adoption and innovation, support 6G communications development, secure pharmaceutical and biotechnology supply chains, and deepen quantum information and civil space cooperation.

Critical Minerals Frameworks&nbsp;

The United States and Japan also signed a critical minerals <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/united-states-japan-framework-for-securing-the-supply-of-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths-through-mining-and-processing/">framework</a> aimed at securing supplies of critical minerals and rare earths through coordinated economic policy and investment.&nbsp;Key features of the framework include joint identification and financing of priority projects, regulatory streamlining to accelerate permitting, measures to promote fair competition and counter unfair trade practices, authorities to deter sensitive asset sales on national security grounds, rapid response mechanisms via the to-be-established U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group, and future collaboration on complementary stockpiling arrangements.

In addition, the United States agreed to memoranda of understanding with both <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-malaysia-concerning-cooperation-to-diversify-global-critical-minerals-supply-chains-and-promote/">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-kingdom-of-thailand-concerning-cooperation-to-diversify-global-critical-minerals-supply-cha/">Thailand</a> on critical minerals, promoting cooperation and information sharing. Although neither memorandum is legally binding, the memorandum with Bangkok gives the United States the “first opportunity to invest . . . &nbsp;in critical mineral assets that may be sold in Thailand” or by a Thai company, while the memorandum with Malaysia prioritizes U.S. investments in critical minerals.&nbsp;

Meanwhile, as part of its trade deal with the United States, Cambodia is set to ease restrictions on U.S. investment in its territory for the extraction of critical minerals.

Export Control Cooperation

Cambodia and Malaysia also agreed to differing extents, to harmonize their export control regimes with that of the United States. While Cambodia agreed to align with U.S. export controls “on a case-by-case basis, based on requests from the United States,” Malaysia agreed to “align with all unilateral export controls in force by the United States.”&nbsp;

Should trade tensions between the United States and China again escalate, it is possible that Washington and Beijing could walk back their commitments.  

It is unclear how these trade deals will be impacted if the U.S. Supreme Court determines that the President cannot impose broad tariffs of unlimited duration (i.e., the “trafficking” and “reciprocal” tariffs) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. While companies may create long-term strategies for these frameworks, they should also be prepared for any potential changes to trade policies implemented by the Trump Administration.

Many of these frameworks contain provisions for enhanced oversight of supply chains within various high-technology and critical mineral industries. In parallel with the Trump Administration’s increased attention to supply chain issues such as forced labor and rules of origin, companies that may be affected should ensure they are prepared to capitalize on new opportunities arising from policy and investment changes, while also being ready for potential oversight and regulatory controls.

For additional information on U.S. trade developments, please reach out to <a href="/people/timothy-j-hruby/" type="poa_person" id="18805">Timothy J. Hruby</a>, <a href="/people/alan-g-kashdan/" type="poa_person" id="18840">Alan G. Kashdan</a>, <a href="/people/christopher-a-kimura/" type="poa_person" id="18662">Christopher A. Kimura</a>, <a href="/people/rachel-d-evans/" type="poa_person" id="18789">Rachel D. Evans</a>, or another member of Blank Rome’s <a href="/services-and-industries/international-trade/" type="poa_practice" id="18498">International Trade</a> group. Reece Kaplan, International Trade Paralegal, contributed to this alert. For continuous, up-to-date information on the evolving administrative landscape, check out Blank Rome’s <a href="/special-topics/trump-administration-resource-hub/" type="br_special_topic" id="17608">Trump Administration Resource Hub</a>

This alert was published in The Global Trade Law Journal&nbsp;on January 5, 2026.

White House Announces Multiple Trade Deals Following President Trump’s Tour of Asia

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White House Announces Multiple Trade Deals Following President Trump’s Tour of Asia

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