The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces US economic sanctions programs. During the past decade, the United States has increased dramatically the use and number of economic sanctions programs, leading to an exponential expansion of the number of people and entities subject to sanctions. Sanctions have arguably become as, or more, important to the art of statecraft as the use of kinetic weapons. The increase in the use of sanctions has had a number of consequences, both intended and unintended. Among these, OFAC has seen a significant increase in the number of requests to be delisted – removed from the sanctions list. Delisting requests are handled by a special team within OFAC’s Office of Global Targeting, known as the Reconsideration unit, which is charged with administering an inter-agency process to review each request.
"The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. Each year, OFAC removes numerous individuals and entities from the SDN List. Each removal is based on a thorough review by OFAC. Maintaining the integrity of U.S. sanctions is a high priority for OFAC and is the driving principle behind its rigorous review process that evaluates every request for removal individually on its merits and applies consistent standards to all of them."
While OFAC’s website and many of its press releases announcing the designation of persons and entities have long touted that “the power and integrity of … sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to sanctions lists, … but also from its willingness to remove persons from such lists consistent with the law”, delisting has remained largely a “black box” process for most of OFAC’s existence. Numerous lawsuits have been filed seeking judicial intervention to remedy OFAC’s inaction or rejection of delisting requests, with almost all failing because of a highly deferential standard of judicial review and the enormous discretion Congress has granted OFAC in making its determinations.
The lack of process typical in most other administrative actions (eg, transparent evidentiary records, formal written decisions and opportunities for hearings), combined with limited judicial review and the high level of judicial deference, makes delisting more of an art than a science. Although the process is fundamentally a legal one, where the designation results from policy imperatives, delistings can also implicate foreign policy considerations. As a result, delisting can require a more nuanced approach, addressing not only the factual and legal bases for the listing but also how a delisting is consistent with the foreign policy concerns that resulted in the designation.
Parties seeking delisting may deploy a variety of strategies, sometimes seeking political or diplomatic intervention, and sometimes judicial relief; however, the right mixture of tools and strategies will vary from case to case. Outcomes and timelines can vary dramatically – in our experience, from under two months to over five years – based on the merits of the case itself and the evolving foreign policy landscape applicable to the particular situation. Listed parties may become frustrated by the length of time it may take to achieve a delisting. In most cases, however, the time it takes OFAC to consider a reconsideration request is affected not only by the need to engage with multiple agencies but also by the need to weigh the foreign policy and national security implications of a delisting, especially when combined with the fact that the process often provides little feedback or interaction until it nears the end.
There is no trick to achieving an OFAC delisting. Instead, it requires building a strong basis to support the request, using legal, factual and policy arguments. The burden is on the sanctioned party to demonstrate to OFAC’s satisfaction that the listing was based on erroneous information, that circumstances have changed or that delisting advances other or different sanctions policy or foreign policy goals. It can also be important to tie the delisting to achieving the goals of the sanctions program under which the party was listed. That could mean, for example, that the overall policy has shifted, personal conditions have changed or, in the case of entities, remedial measures have been taken to distance the company from the behavior that resulted in it becoming sanctioned, and thereby aligning the entity’s conduct more closely to US policy objectives that drove the establishment of the sanctions program.
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"Navigating the Path Off the U.S. Sanctions List," by Anthony Rapa, Bradley L. Henry, Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Matthew J. Thomas, and Victoria Ortega was published in Global Investigations Review on July 14, 2026.